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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a better understanding of the underlying dynamics of carriage disputes 
between broadcasters and distributors. Using a political economy perspective, power 
relationships in TV broadcasting are discussed. By developing an analytical model by which 
means the bargaining position of a broadcaster and distributor respectively can be assessed, it 
becomes possible to capture all decisive elements that determine the bargaining position of 
negotiating firms during carriage agreements. 
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Undeniably, television broadcasting markets are in a period of industrial reform these days. 
Digital technology has broken traditional boundaries between IT, telecom and media worlds, 
and lowered barriers for new players to enter the production and distribution business of 
television programming. Like other media industries, television broadcasting has been highly 
affected by the digitization wave that enables convergence players to explore new business 
opportunities and address disruptive challenges across the value chain. The far-reaching 
integration of broadcast content with broadband delivery platforms, exemplified by the rise of 
over-the-top (OTT) television platforms (Netflix, Hulu and BBC iPlayer) and Connected TV 
devices, is producing opportunities to bypass established distributors and destabilizing 
mainstream business models (Given et al., 2012). Against the background of these 
technological developments, the TV industry is facing turbulent economic times, marked by 
an increased level of market competition and lower degree of profitability. Basically, a set of 
interrelated structural market evolutions have been eroding the advertising-based business 
model on which most TV broadcasters used to depend. Not only have television advertising 
markets fallen dramatically during the economic crisis (minus 16% in Europe), audience 
fragmentation due to increased channel competition, time-shifted viewing and ad-skipping is 
further affecting the foundations of the ad-supported business model (Carlson, 2006; Crampes 
et al., 2009). 
The increasing complexity of the ecosystem, together with the impact of the global 
economic downturn, has urged TV broadcasters to look for alternative and more stable 
sources of income. Indeed, the high dependence on advertising markets makes TV 
broadcasters extremely vulnerable to economic recession and necessitates a diversification of 
revenues. In contrast to advertising, subscriptions for premium cable and satellite services 
have proved quite consistent during economic downturns and have been steadily growing 
(Evens, 2010; Picard, 2011). Unsurprisingly, broadcasters are casting covetous eyes on the 
comfortable profit margins of television distributors and have started to demand a fair share of 
the profits made by these platform operators. Broadcasters claim they carry the bulk of 
investments in quality content whereas distributors take a disproportional share of the pie, 
without significantly contributing to the financing and production of that content. Waterman 
and Han (2010) provide an empirical basis for such claims, arguing that distributors have been 
able to take far greater economic advantage of the digital transition than broadcasters. 
According to UK regulator Ofcom (2012), public service broadcasters (PSBs) in the UK 
spend 27% of their revenues on first-run originations compared to only 2% for pay-TV 
operators. 
As early as 2004, free-to-air (FTA) television networks in the United States announced 
their intentions to seek cash payments from cable operators for retransmission of their 
broadcast signals. These payments are comparable to the payments distributors make for pay-
TV channels. Because some broadcasters have been quite aggressive in the pursuit of cash 
payments, tough negotiations often ended up in blackouts, with either broadcasters refusing to 
accept the financial terms of distributors, or distributors choosing not to carry greedy 
television channels. In recent years, the amount of carriage disputes (channel conflicts) 
between broadcasters and distributors of television programming has multiplied (Caves, 2005; 
Evens and Donders, 2013). Power conflicts do not remain limited to the North American 
industry, but also found their way to Canadian and European television markets. O’Reilly 
(2008) points that the sharp increase in negotiation impasses follows structural market 
changes that have come along with the digitization of the television industry, and the 
expanding business roles broadcasters and distributors occupy. O’Reilly furthers claims that 
competitive entry in television distribution has, ironically, resulted in higher programming 
expenses for pay-TV operators and higher costs that are passed on to subscribers. 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze how broadcaster-to-distributor relationships are 
structured and provide a framework that helps analyzing and interpreting the nature of power 
relationships between broadcasters and distributors. Since most of the public debates occur in 
a vacuum, however, empirical evidence is needed to ground the arguments of broadcasters 
and distributors respectively, and justify policy intervention in the market. Hence, a systemic 
overview of broadcaster-to-distributor and related markets would allow policymakers to 
monitor developments in the market, identify possible problems and define adequate answers 
based on the availability of reliable and valid research data. Empirical findings drawn from in-
depth with 36 policymakers and industry representatives from several markets (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, UK and US), and document analysis (with a focus on media 
regulation) will allow us to build an analytical framework that accurately describes the 
individual nature of relationships between broadcasters and distributors and that helps 
assessing economic power in broadcaster-to-distributor markets. Such instrument will provide 
insight into the economic mechanisms underlying the production and distribution of media 
content, and eventually help policymakers in really understanding the hotly debated carriage 
disputes in many markets around the world, with a substantial influence on the quality and 
approach of broadcasting policy. Using the instrument, regulatory interventions can be made 
when analysis would show out that there is inequality of bargaining power and that a stronger 
party is manifestly abusing these advantages in bargaining power. 
STATE OF RETRANMISSION PAYMENTS 
Technological developments, as well as changes in the institutional framework, are in the 
process of fundamentally transforming, and possibly disrupting, legacy television business 
models. Furthermore, economic power has been slightly transferred to ‘gatekeepers’ who 
derive a dominant position in the business ecosystem by controlling competitive bottlenecks 
(Evens, 2013a). As technology shocks challenge the established power relationships in 
television, interactions between broadcasters and distributors may incur conflicts of interest 
and eventually result in carriage disputes. Whereas distributors are slightly moving towards 
commissioning and creating original content, broadcasters are bypassing traditional 
distributors to team up with over-the-top (OTT) services and build a direct gateway to the 
viewer (Venturini, 2011). 
Carriage disputes typically occur in broadcaster-to-distributor markets, where broadcasters 
(firms that produce and aggregate content into channels) and television distributors (firms that 
bundle these channels into different packages, or offer them à la carte to the viewers) 
negotiate about the carriage of particular video programming, the price to be paid for the 
exploitation of that programming, and (in some cases) the tier and position in the electronic 
programming guide (EPG) on which the programming is to be offered to the viewer 
(Bergman and Stennek, 2007). The outcome of such negotiations is largely determined by the 
bargaining power negotiating parties have. Broadcasters and distributors respectively have 
leveraged market power to get most value out of carriage deals and used their political 
connections to shape the regulatory framework in their favor (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; 
Evens, 2013b). 
Overview of carriage disputes 
Most of the incidents have appeared in the US so far, with high-profile disputes between 
Fox and Time Warner Cable (TWC), and between ABC and Cablevision. The battle between 
Fox and TWC first emerged late November 2009, and was settled 1
st
 of January, when News 
Corporation (the owner of Fox) and TWC reached an agreement. The deal threatened to affect 
approximately 13 million TWC subscribers, among others in New York, Los Angeles, Detroit 
and Dallas, and was settled before any programming disruption occurred. While initially, 
TWC was said to have been willing to pay $0.20 per subscriber per month and News 
Corporation was seeking $1, the two were thought to have settled at an initial fee in the $0.50 
range. In the second high-profile dispute, 3.1 million Cablevision subscribers lost their ABC 
affiliate WABC when Cablevision’s dispute with ABC resulted in a day-long blackout, 
ending 15 minutes into the 2010 Oscar Academy Awards ceremony. It was the first time since 
2008 that a major cable operator had lost a broadcast signal. Although the retransmission 
terms were kept confidential, most industry watchers believe ABC was paid between $0.27 
and 0.37 per Cablevision subscriber. According to a report by SNL Kagan (2010), 
retransmission revenues have revitalized the broadcast model and have now become a 
standardized practice to reassure investors about the future viability of FTA networks. 
Furthermore, retransmission payments implied a fundamental change to the economic 
relationships in the industry to bring FTA networks more on par with cable networks. 
Ranging from $0.01 to about $4 per subscriber per month – with an estimated average of 
$0.25 – retransmission fees represent a solid income source for broadcast networks. SNL 
Kagan estimates that retransmission fees in the US grew from $215 million to $762 million 
between 2006 and 2009, and they are projected to exceed $2.6 billion in 2016. With an annual 
growth rate of 19%, these payments would constitute 13.3% of total broadcaster revenues by 
2016. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of US retransmission fees (SNL Kagan, 2010). 
According to an Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates analysis (2011), the UK has the least 
generous television retransmission terms for FTA broadcasters when compared to a wide 
range of comparable developed world markets such as Australia, France, Spain and the United 
States. The report reveals that, in contrast to the other markets studied in the report, UK FTA 
broadcasters – most of them with public service broadcasting (PSB) requirements – enjoy 
only limited copyright protection and need to pay significant access fees to platforms for 
retransmission. In October 2011, the BBC claimed that it could save £50 million over five 
years if leading pay-TV platform Sky would waive the costs of carrying the BBC’s channels 
on its satellite platform. Sky justified its access charges by arguing that the company had to 
recoup the £1 billion investments costs in its satellite platform (Webster, 2011). As a result of 
the public controversy following the BBC’s statement, Sky published a new rate card which 
brought in a reduction in platform contribution for more than a hundred channels, and 
announced it would reduce the costs over 50 per cent by 2014 – from £24.4 million to £11 
million for the main UK free-to-air broadcasters. According to calculations by newspaper The 
Guardian, the BBC will see its Sky access charges reduced from £9.9 million a year to £4.4 
million, ITV's charges will fall from £8.1million to £3.1million, Channel 4 will see its charges 
reduced from £5 million to £2.7 million, and Channel 5's costs will drop from £1.4 million to 
£800,000. The PSB’s, however, also argued that Sky should actually pay them for the 
privilege of carrying their channels, as they are the most popular on the Sky platform. Based 
on comparisons with the US, the PSBs claimed that Sky should need to pay £120 million to 
offer the channels to satellite TV customers. Another study, commissioned by the UK’s 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, estimated the impact of retransmission payments 
on PSB’s revenues between £190 and £220 million (Mediatique, 2012). Although Sky refuted 
the argument that it should pay PSBs for their channels, News Corporation, Sky’s biggest 
shareholder, has successfully persuaded pay-TV operators to pay the Fox FTA network in the 
US (Sweney, 2012). 
Implications for public welfare 
Because of the characteristics of public goods, carriage disputes in broadcaster-to-
distributor markets have received wide attention in popular press and trade magazines. 
Broadcasters as well as distributors have been involved in a ‘hegemonic struggle’ to convince 
public opinion that their negotiation counterpart is not playing fair, and are devoting 
considerable time advocating against each other, mainly through commercials and 
(sponsored) press coverage. On the one side, broadcasters demand a fair compensation for the 
investments in original programming, and claim that programming costs account for a small – 
and declining – proportion of a cable operator’s revenues. According to Eisenach (2009), a 
study sponsored by the National Association of Broadcasters, US cable operator’s gross 
profits increased with $14.03 to $62.99 per subscriber per month  between 2003 and 2006. 
During that same period, programming expenses increased with $2.84 to $18.47 per 
subscriber per month. Hence, broadcasters point that cable operators’ profits rose by about 
five times as much as their programming expenses. Moreover, broadcasters contend that the 
distributors have monopoly power due to high concentration and entry barriers, in contrast to 
the highly competitive market for video programming. Hence, broadcasters are not well-
positioned to extract excessive retransmission fees from cable operators it is said (Eisenach 
and Caves, 2010). 
On the other side, distributors complain about the ‘brinkmanship’ tactics that broadcasters 
use to receive higher fees in their negotiations with cable operators. Such tactics include 
various threats and conduct that harm the distributor more than they harm the broadcaster, 
including withdrawing signals from the distribution platform and thus causing a blackout. 
Salop et al. (2010a) show how brinkmanship behavior harms consumers through service 
interruptions and higher subscription prices. First, blackouts cause subscribers to lose access 
to desirable programming, especially when blackouts coincide with popular events like the 
Academy Awards (officially known as The Oscars) or the Super Bowl. Blackouts can harm 
viewers by leading to uncertainty and anger that programming will be available. Secondly, 
blackout threats result in higher programming fees which lead inevitably to higher cable 
subscription prices in the US. According to the distributors, basic and expanded programming 
costs increased by 437% from 1995 to 2008, while the retail price for expanded services grew 
by 122%. Assuming a pass-through rate of 100%, retransmission payments in 2006 would 
have been responsible for $3.78 of a subscriber’s annual cable bill, $10.08 in 2010 and $26.01 
by 2016 (Salop et al., 2010b). 
POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN TELEVISION BROADCASTING 
Much of the literature on power relationships in television broadcasting is rooted in the 
political economy of communication. This critical approach is aims at unraveling social and, 
in particular, power relations within media ecosystems and analyzing structural processes of 
control over the production, distribution and consumption of information goods. The political 
economy of communication examines the institutional aspects of media and 
telecommunications systems, with particular attention to economic attributes of power, and 
the historical relationships between industry, state and consumers (Mosco, 2009). Through 
studying the concentration of ownership and control in media industries, political economists 
deal with corporate power and look at structural inequalities within capitalist market systems 
(Winseck, 2011).  
Following this perspective, firms may exert market power when achieving monopolistic 
control over industry bottlenecks, such as premium sports rights or distribution networks. 
Bottlenecks refer to scarce but essential resources upon which the economic performance of 
an industry strongly depends. Hence, ownership of industry bottlenecks allows companies to 
play a ‘gate-keeper’ role in the market. The control of access to scarce resources, however, 
may be jeopardized in an era of plenty, which urges firms to seek new ways of constraining 
abundance in order to preserve market power (Mansell, 1999). With the rapid adoption of 
digital media technologies that substantially reduce distribution bottlenecks, Flew (2011, pp. 
86-87) questions ‘whether the economic power conferred by control over distribution 
channels and networks is diminishing over time or is being reconfigured around alternative 
sources of economic rents, such as highly restrictive copyright and intellectual property 
regimes’. 
With regard to power relationships in television broadcasting, and more specifically 
between broadcasters and distributors, traditional political economists consider power 
relations as static and determined, contending that distributors have gained economic power to 
the detriment of creative authors and content producers. A seminal contribution to the field 
was made by Garnham (1987, p. 31), arguing that ‘it is cultural distribution, not cultural 
production, that is the key locus of power and profit’. The author contends that because the 
business of cultural goods is as much about ‘creating audiences’ as it is about ‘producing 
cultural artifacts’, distribution is characterized by the highest level of capital intensity, 
ownership concentration and multi-nationalization. Distributors act as gate-keepers, 
controlling access and bundling programming to commoditized audiences. Hence, controlling 
the distribution bottleneck is like having a ‘liquor license’ that awards distributors a privileged 
position along the value chain. In contrast to the high number of producers, economic power 
resides with those few firms that have oligopolistic control over the delivery of cultural 
productions – referring to the hourglass structure of media industries (many producers, few 
distributors). This concentration of ownership may result in power asymmetry with relations 
of power skewed towards distributors, and broadcasters highly depending on delivery 
networks controlled by multichannel operators (Hesmondhalgh, 2007). 
Another stream of literature points that technological forces, and more abundance in 
transmission technologies in particular may loosen and eventually eliminate this distribution 
bottleneck. Hence, economic power is considered a fluid concepts that, depending on the 
configuration of business activities, circulates within the industry. As spectrum scarcity comes 
to an end, new distributors may come into the market and erode the power of established 
gatekeepers. Todreas (1999, p. 34) points out that profits move upstream, stating that 
‘conduit[s] will resemble a commodity while content will have the opportunity to create 
branded, high-value added products’. Whereas the ‘analogue era’ was characterized by little 
competition with incumbents protected by technology and politics, the proliferation of new 
distribution ‘pipes’ in the digital era will transfer power to producers of content, who will 
benefit from distributors’ rivalry for delivering the best content. Control of intellectual 
property thus becomes a lucrative asset for the content business, possibly evolving as the new 
competitive bottleneck. Must-have broadcasters gain leverage over distributors in negotiations 
and may derive better financial terms as the distribution bottleneck erodes. Following the 
thesis that the broadcasting industry is evolving from a distribution economy to an attention 
economy (Davenport and Beck, 2001), powerful brands that successfully capture and 
aggregate consumer attention may benefit from scarcity. Hence, economic power in 
broadcasting may shift from a distributor’s ability to ‘reach’ mass audiences to a broadcaster’s 
ability to ‘attract and maintain’ mass audiences (Christophers, 2008). 
Broadcaster-to-distributor market 
Instead of this polarized theory-driven discussion of which player exerts power over the 
other reducing the debate to a ‘patron-client’ relationship, with companies either in 
distribution or programming dominating the market, the allocation of power in television 
broadcasting is probably much more complicated. Rather than sticking to hollow aphorisms 
such as ‘content is King, but distribution is King Kong’, we assume that the allocation of 
power is not a linear process but highly depends on the institutional context of broadcasting, 
including the set of complex relationships between different parties in the business ecosystem. 
Hence, economic power, and more in particular bargaining power, in television broadcasting 
markets is context-specific, highly determined by the allocation of scarce resources within the 
industry, the individual nature of the broadcaster–distributor relationship and path dependency 
in media and telecommunications policies. As the strategic context of digital broadcasting is 
continuously in motion, the balance of power in the television industry is in flux and these 
relationships lack mutual trust (Donders and Evens, 2010, 2011; Evens and Donders, 2013). 
The increasing sources of uncertainty in the broadcaster-to-distributor market, in which 
both parties negotiate the economic terms of distribution similar to those of manufacturers and 
retailers, however, have provoked conflicts between broadcasters and multichannel operators, 
who are grasping the opportunities for intervening in each other’s markets, creating sources of 
market power and hence influencing the distribution of revenues in the system. Figure 2 
shows that pay-TV operators are looking to partner with content producers (1) and advertisers 
(2), whereas broadcasters are directly connecting with viewers (3) and network carriers (4). 
These conflicts, resulting from but also provoking strategic by-passing behavior, eventually 
end up in a battle for power and control in broadcast markets and are illustrated by tough 
negotiations for carriage payments. In the United States, broadcast networks ABC, NBC and 
Fox have launched the Hulu platform, which allows consumers to watch their favorite shows 
directly over the Internet across multiple screens. Hulu forms a counterweight to YouTube 
and the ‘TV Everywhere’ services deployed by US distributors such as AT&T and Comcast. 
Similarly, Google-owned YouTube has announced partnerships with over 20,000 content 
providers to provide an online alternative to television broadcasting. In response, US 
broadcast networks have collectively blocked access to Google TV and have demanded fair 
payment if their shows are retransmitted by Google. 
 
Figure 2: Double multi-sided platform market structure (Evens and Donders, 2013) 
First and foremost, the broadcaster-to-distributor market is characterized by a mutual 
dependence between broadcasters and distributors. Such horizontal relationship is based upon 
the complementariness of their interests: broadcasters need distribution to reach an audience 
and sell advertising, while distributors need broadcast programming to attract subscribers 
(Bergman and Stennek, 2007). During negotiations, broadcasters and distributors bargain 
about the level of payments and agree upon the economic conditions for carriage. Distributors 
are aware of their control over the supplier’s access to consumers, which may give them a 
strategic advantage in carriage negotiations. In buyer–seller relationships, however, it is not 
always in the retailer’s best interest to reduce a supplier’s margin, especially not – like in 
multichannel markets – where the value proposition of a platform strongly depends on the 
supplier’s input quality. For the entire broadcasting industry, squeezing the margins of less 
powerful broadcasters may prove counterproductive in the long run, diminishing consumer 
choice and quality, and restricting financial capacity to invest in innovative content and 
services. By receiving monthly US$7 per subscriber, cable channel HBO is able to continue 
its investments in expensive high-quality series and deliver a value-added component for US 
cable providers – whereas the average fee for cable channels is less than US$1 per subscriber. 
Hence, the industry’s long-term viability may crucially depend on a fair distribution of 
investments and profits between all stakeholders in the media ecosystem (Donders and 
Pauwels, 2012). 
Since each party controls crucial platform functionalities, one could speak of a market with 
bilateral bargaining power, which closely relates to a second distinctive feature of this double 
multi-sided platform broadcaster-to-distributor market (see Figure 2). Current frictions and 
tough bargaining games between broadcasters and distributors directly relate to the arising 
nested, double multi-sided platform structure of the broadcasting industry. Since broadcasters 
and distributors both operate as a multi-sided platform, leveraging common components and 
shared user relationships, they are moving into another’s market, resulting in a multi-platform 
bundle, a phenomenon called ‘platform envelopment’ (Eisenmann et al., 2011). HBO has 
sought direct access to viewers by providing online programming via its paid ‘HBO GO’ app, 
whereas cable operator Comcast has swallowed broadcaster NBC to secure access to popular 
programming. Such strategies for expanding market power eventually lead to corporate 
clashes and anti-competitive behavior. Coordinating demand between multiple markets 
enables each platform to employ strategies to internalize market externalities and reduce the 
‘taxes’ imposed by other’s platforms. Especially when they are vertically integrated with 
programming suppliers, distributors with market power may have incentives to set higher 
retail prices and discourage the promotion of unaffiliated channels (Waterman and Choi, 
2011). By exerting pricing power, distributors can reduce the exposure of broadcast channels 
and negatively influence advertising revenues of rivaling channels (Kind et al., 2010). In 
addition to this pricing power, distributors eventually decide upon channel carriage, tier and 
position in the electronic programming guide. By allocating a channel in a high price-tier, or 
by positioning it as a high-number channel, distributors can negatively influence a channel’s 
rating and performance, and, hence, exert bargaining power during negotiations (Chen and 
Waterman, 2007). After eight years of negotiation, Time Warner Cable and NFL Network 
finally reached an agreement in September 2012. NFL Network will be put on a basic digital 
tier rather than a high-priced sports tier package, and will thus benefit from higher viewership 
and retransmission payments. 
BARGAINING POWER IN BROADCASTER-TO-DISTRIBUTOR MARKETS 
So far, few research effort has addressed the origins of power positions in television 
broadcasting. Although literature suggests that the vast majority of buyer-supplier 
relationships are skewed in favor of large retail buyers (e.g. Dukes et al., 2006; Hald et al., 
2009), the debate on which resources affect, influence and determine bargaining power in 
television broadcasting remains largely unsolved. According to Industrial Organization 
theory, bargaining power is enhanced by the concentrated ownership of critical resources, the 
absence of substitutes for dominant buyers and/or suppliers, combined with the degree of 
product differentiation and the level of switching costs (Caves, 2005; Comanor and Rey, 
2003). Media economics research has predominantly focused on the impact of firm size 
(Adilov and Alexander, 2006; Chipty, 1995; Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Ford and Jackson, 
1997), vertical integration (Chen and Waterman, 2007; Hong et al., 2011; Lee and Kim, 2011; 
Singer and Sidak, 2007; Waterman and Choi, 2011) and conglomerateness (Goolsbee, 2007; 
Waterman, 2007). The abovementioned studies emphasize that market and firm structure are 
the main dimensions of the origins of bargaining power. However, we claim that strong 
economic positions not always pay off in superior commercial outcomes as favorable deals 
could be leveraged through personal relationships, negotiation skills, high motivation, strong 
leadership, and so on (van Dijk and Vermunt, 2000). Additionally, a change in the policy 
framework and regulatory environment can rebalance existing power relationships and may 
turn a seller’s market into a buyer’s market (Brown, 2003). Hence, we propose a 
multidimensional approach to bargaining power in television broadcasting, identifying five 
clusters of variables that help assessing the bargaining position of broadcasters and 
distributors respectively during carriage negotiations (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Bargaining parameters in television broadcasting 
First, industry variables refer to the market structure in which broadcasters and distributors 
respectively operate. The degree of market concentration, measured by the m-firm 
concentration ratio (Cm) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), is commonly used as an 
indicator of a firm’s market power. A firm derives power by virtue of controlling a large 
portion of the market, with a monopoly (one seller, many buyers) and monopsony (many 
sellers, one buyer) as extreme cases, and when the firm is protected by high barriers to entry. 
In this context, asymmetries in bargaining power might create pivotal power with particular 
broadcasters and/or distributors. This might occur when a broadcaster has an outside option 
and the flexibility to deal with other distributors if the bargaining between the two parties 
breaks down. Sports networks, or similar must-have channels, might have the ability to play 
pay-TV operators off against each other and sell exclusively to the highest bidder. Likewise, 
cable operators who are so large that their commitment is essential to a channel’s decision to 
deliver might have significant bargaining power, and are able to extract large discounts from 
broadcasters. Hence, monopolists in cable television have a ‘make-or-break’ effect on a 
broadcaster’s ability to successfully produce and distribute programming in a particular 
market, and obtain lower input costs for programming. Hence, firm size and industry 
consolidation have an important impact on retransmission negotiations between broadcasters 
and distributors. Nevertheless, the intensity of competition is largely influenced by the rate of 
technological change. Indeed, technology abundance could eliminate the distribution 
bottleneck, giving rise to alternative distribution opportunities including OTT platforms and 
Connected TV services, and erode the presumed power of pay-TV operators. 
Secondly, organizational variables relate to firm-specific characteristics of the 
broadcasters and distributors involved in a carriage negotiation. As discussed previously, firm 
size (market share, customer base or geographical coverage) provides a substantial leverage to 
bargain more favorable carriage conditions. Vertical integration might allow cable operators 
to create synergies in terms of scale economies, and easily share information with producers 
about viewer tastes and preferences, but also raises create anticompetitive effects to non-
integrated suppliers and buyers. Vertical control of affiliated networks may create incentives 
to stop supplying competing distributors and deny access to necessary input. Conversely, 
backward integration allows cable operators to deny unaffiliated networks access to their 
subscribers, and give carriage priority to affiliated channels (in terms of better positioning and 
pricing). Nevertheless, the majority of ‘independent’ networks is owned by large media 
conglomerates that are not involved in cable distribution (such as Viacom) and thus benefit 
from the financial resources and bargaining leverage of these media conglomerates. During 
carriage negotiations, financial resilience is therefore one of the most significant advantages 
that bargaining firms have. Furthermore, broadcasters that are highly dependent on 
distributors for the financing of their programs (in terms of total sales) might put themselves 
in a weak negotiation position. 
Thirdly, distinctive product characteristics may bestow negotiating firms with a strategic 
advantage. Idiosyncratic assets, transaction-specific investments that cannot be deployed for 
any other purpose, create dependency and lock in customers forcing them to sustain the 
relationship. Independent broadcasters often invest in committed (or sunk) assets when 
producing TV programs tailored for (exclusive) carriage by a particular pay-TV operator. The 
fact that the producer has no outside options to monetize its specific programming without 
sacrificing the majority of its productive value places that production company in a dependent 
and hence vulnerable position. Moreover, broadcasters that deliver differentiated programs 
might have better cards during carriage negotiations – especially when they are able to bring 
in un-served target groups or provide value-added programming by which means distributors 
can differentiate from competing platforms. It is no surprise that ESPN, HBO and Sports Net 
tend to negotiate the highest fees in the US market. Since network distribution is likely to 
become a commodity and differentiation originates from enriching content services and state-
of-the-art technology, this might benefit the bargaining position of must-have input suppliers. 
Consequently, strong media brands have an advantage during negotiations because they create 
customer loyalty and reduce churn. In this context, switching costs form an important 
determinant of bargaining power. When a TV broadcaster is dropped by a platform, a trade-
off between churn (switching distributors) and viewer impairment (switching channels) takes 
place. The easier it becomes for a customer to switch between platforms, the more bargain 
power a broadcaster gains. 
Fourthly, personality traits might heavily influence the bargaining process and eventually 
impact on the outcome of the negotiations. Since trust is an important determinant of 
cooperative buyer-supplier relationships, personality traits of individual negotiators are an 
important determinant of the ‘atmosphere’ of a carriage negotiation. Television is a ‘people’s 
business’ where a network of interpersonal relationships is a valuable asset and often makes 
the difference between failure or success. In some carriage disputes, CEOs are not willing to 
put their ego aside and enter into agreement with a buyer (seller). Hence, the social context in 
which the negotiations take place are as important as the structure of the industry or media 
firm. Although strong economic positions can help a bargaining party, negotiators with good 
bargaining skills and strong leadership can make a remarkable difference around the table. 
High relative familiarity and empathy involves a close, cooperative and sometimes friendly 
relationship and often ensures an agreement that is perceived as fair by both bargaining 
parties. In a similar way, broadcasters and distributors with a history of conflicts will lack a 
reasonable level of trust and could take a tough draw during the negotiations. 
Finally, the policy and regulatory context might impact on the established power balance 
between broadcasters and distributors. Copyright law plays a decisive role in retransmission 
disputes and defines to what extent distributors need to receive consent from and pay royalties 
to broadcasters (or collective rights associations). In addition, the competition policy 
framework has been applied to facilitate free and fair competition in the TV broadcasting and 
distribution market, and ensures a level-playing field for broadcasters and distributors in their 
respective markets. In the past, competition authorities have been dealing with dominant 
positions in broadcasting and distribution markets, and have stimulated competition in the 
market. Complementing competition policy, media-specific provisions are affecting the 
relationship between broadcasters and distributors. In the US for example the Program Access 
Rules were designed to protect unaffiliated distributors and protect them from anti-
competitive behavior. Similarly, the retransmission consent regime allowed broadcasters to 
demand a retransmission fee from distributors. Also may/must carry rules, media ownership 
caps and listed events regulations affected the power configurations in the broadcaster-to-
distributor market. Furthermore, telecommunications regulation have gained importance in 
broadcasting markets now that telephone and telecommunications networks are playing a 
growing part in the TV industry. Hence, open access regulation and the hotly-debated net 
neutrality issues put an enduring pressure on the profitability of network carriers. 
DISCUSSION 
The main goal of this paper was to analyze how broadcaster-to-distributor relationships are 
structured and provide a framework that helps interpreting the nature of power relationships 
between broadcasters and distributors. Whereas political economy of communications 
literature takes a rather oversimplified view to this problem assuming a patron-client 
relationship, we have claimed that the allocation of bargaining power within the industry is 
largely determined by the ownership of scarce resources and influenced by structural features 
of the market wherein broadcasters and distributors operate. Contending that each party 
controls critical platform functionalities, we have argued that the broadcaster-to-distributor 
market is characterized by bilateral bargaining power, eventually leading to platform 
envelopment strategies. 
Building further on Industrial Organization theory, combined with insights from political 
economy, it has been argued that bargaining power not only stems from market and 
organizational structure (such as firm size, vertical integration and conglomerateness), but is 
also largely affected by the social context. Indeed, market power not always pays in superior 
carriage deals, but is also leverages through personal relationships, bargaining skills and 
strong leadership. Furthermore, the policy and regulatory environment has a decisive impact 
on the structure and performance of firms operating in the industry, and hence on the outcome 
of commercial negotiations between broadcasters and distributors. Taking a multidimensional 
approach to power, the model defines five important determinants of bargaining power during 
carriage negotiations. Assessing the framework to both broadcasters and distributors allows 
policymakers and regulatory authorities for identifying potential bottlenecks and undertake 
appropriate measurements to provide a level-playing field and ensure balanced competition 
between broadcasters and distributors (including OTT operators). 
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